

Reconsideration Request Form

Version of 11 April 2013

ICANN's Board Governance Committee is responsible for receiving requests for reconsideration from any person or entity that has been materially affected by any ICANN staff action or inaction if such affected person or entity believes the action contradicts established ICANN policies, or by actions or inactions of the Board that such affected person or entity believes has been taken without consideration of material information. Note: This is a brief summary of the relevant Bylaws provisions. For more information about ICANN's reconsideration process, please visit <http://www.icann.org/en/general/bylaws.htm#IV> and <http://www.icann.org/en/committees/board-governance/>.

This form is provided to assist a requester in submitting a Reconsideration Request, and identifies all required information needed for a complete Reconsideration Request. This template includes terms and conditions that shall be signed prior to submission of the Reconsideration Request.

Requesters may submit all facts necessary to demonstrate why the action/inaction should be reconsidered. However, argument shall be limited to 25 pages, double-spaced and in 12 point font.

For all fields in this template calling for a narrative discussion, the text field will wrap and will not be limited.

Please submit completed form to reconsideration@icann.org.

1. Requester Information

Name: Steve DelBianco; Vice Chair for Policy Coordination, on behalf of the ICANN Business Constituency

Email: Contact Information Redacted

Name: Rafik Dammak; Chair, on behalf of the ICANN Noncommercial Stakeholders Group (NCSG)

E-mail: Contact Information Redacted

2. Request for Reconsideration of (check one only):

Board action/inaction

Staff action/inaction

3. Description of specific action you are seeking to have reconsidered.

(Provide as much detail as available, such as date of Board meeting, reference to Board resolution, etc. You may provide documents. All documentation provided will be made part of the public record.)

The Business Constituency and the Noncommercial Stakeholders Group seek reconsideration of Resolutions 2015.09.28.04 (Renewal of .Cat Registry Agreement), 2015.09.28.05 (Renewal of .Travel Registry Agreement) and 2015.09.28.06 (Renewal of .Pro Registry Agreement). These Resolutions were approved as part of the Consent Agenda at the Regular Meeting of the ICANN Board held on September 28, 2015.

4. Date of action/inaction:

(Note: If Board action, this is usually the first date that the Board posted its resolution and rationale for the resolution or for inaction, the date the Board considered an item at a meeting.)

September 28, 2015

5. On what date did you become aware of the action or that action would not be taken?

(Provide the date you learned of the action/that action would not be taken. If more than fifteen days has passed from when the action was taken or not taken to when you learned of the action or inaction, please provide discussion of the gap of time.)

September 28, 2015, upon publication of the Approved Board Resolutions.

6. Describe how you believe you are materially affected by the action or inaction:

The Business Constituency (BC) is a member of ICANN's Commercial Stakeholder Group (CSG) and participates in the activities of the Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) and its policymaking Council. The mission of the Business Constituency is to ensure that "ICANN policy positions derive from broad stakeholder participation in a common forum for suppliers and users", and, more generally, to assure that ICANN policies, including binding Consensus Policies, are developed through the bottom-up consensus-driven mechanism of the multistakeholder model (MSM).

The Noncommercial Stakeholders Group (NCSG) is the home of civil society and individual noncommercial users within ICANN. With two constituent components, the NCSG has in excess of 500 members from over 100 countries and is an active participant in the GNSO and its policymaking Council.

As stated in the BC [comment](#) on the “Proposed Renewal of .TRAVEL Sponsored TLD Registry Agreement”, and restated in regard to the renewal registry Agreements for [.Cat](#) and [.Pro](#):

“Concern About Top Down, Staff--Initiated Process Inconsistent with ICANN’s Bylaws

We wish to make clear at the outset that the BC’s concern is not in regard to the adoption of new gTLD rights protection mechanisms (RPMs) for legacy gTLDs. The BC has been a strong advocate for these RPMs as applied to new gTLD registries, and would support the GNSO taking up the question of and initiating a PDP regarding whether they should become consensus policies applicable to all legacy gTLDs.”

While the NCSG shares the BC’s desire to initiate a PDP on this matter, the NCSG does have concerns about the appropriateness and desirability of applying the new gTLD rights protection mechanisms (RPMs) to legacy gTLDs.

Our joint concern, though, is that a unilateral decision by ICANN contractual staff within the GDD to take the new gTLD registry agreement as the starting point for renewal RAs for legacy gTLDs has the effect of transforming the PDDRP and the URS into de facto Consensus Policies without following the procedures laid out in ICANN’s Bylaws for their creation. To be clear, we take no objection to a registry voluntarily agreeing to adopt RPMs in their contractual negotiations with ICANN.

The fact that these RPMs are present in all three proposed renewal RAs referenced in this letter reinforces that conclusion. While consistency of registry agreements is a worthwhile goal, it should not trump consistency of action in accord with ICANN’s Bylaws. ICANN’s current Consensus Policies are listed at <http://www.icann.org/en/resources/registrars/consensus-policies>. While the UDRP is a listed Consensus Policy, the PDDRP and the URS are not. We therefore question the authority for ICANN staff to seek to impose PDDRP and URS on legacy gTLDs through the contract renewal process.

As the NCSG public comment states “requiring legacy gTLD’s to base their renewal terms on multiple policies developed for the new gTLD programme is an explicit policy decision reserved for the community through the GNSO PDP process, not for staff to create under the guise of contractual negotiations”.

The BC comment letters also noted relevant provisions of the Final Report on Policy and Implementation (P&I) (<https://community.icann.org/display/PIWG/Final+Report+Redline+Version>) and, in particular, the following Principle: “Policy development processes must function in a bottom--up manner. **The process must not be conducted in a top--down manner and then imposed on stakeholders**, although an exception may be made in emergency cases such as where there are risks to security and stability, as defined in ICANN’s Security, Stability and Resiliency framework.”

(Emphasis added). No such emergency existed in regard to the renewal of these three legacy Registry Agreements.

The BC comment letters also cited another part of the P&I Report, noting that “the “Principles / Requirements that apply primarily to Policy” (p. 14) states as its first Standard, “As outlined in the ICANN Bylaws, the GNSO is responsible for developing and recommending to the ICANN Board substantive policies relating to generic top--level domains. **As such, gTLD policy development should not take place outside of the GNSO.**” (Emphasis added) In the matter we are addressing in this letter, policy development has arguably taken place outside of the GNSO.”

Finally, as also noted in BC comment letters, “Another troubling aspect of this staff decision is that it has been undertaken in the absence of a full evaluation of the issues related to the new gTLD RPMs... We find it troubling that ICANN contractual staff would seek to insert specific new gTLD program RPMs in legacy gTLD renewal RAs when ICANN policy staff have yet to define the issues they implicate, and the GNSO has yet to receive the Issues Report that may be the basis of one or more PDPs; including one addressing whether they should become Consensus Policies applicable to all gTLDs.”

Indeed, ICANN staff has just issued, on October 9th, the “Preliminary Issue Report on a GNSO Policy Development Process to Review All Rights Protection Mechanisms in All gTLDs”. This report will be considered by the GNSO Council and the ICANN community at the upcoming ICANN 54 meeting in Dublin, Ireland and, following a public comment period scheduled to end on November 30th, will result in a Final Staff report being issued on or about December 10th.

That Final Report will probably provide the foundation for the initiation of one or more Policy Development Processes (PDP) addressing whether the new gTLD RPMs should be adjusted and, more relevant to this reconsideration request, whether they should be applied to legacy gTLDs and/or integrated with the UDRP. Indeed, the Preliminary Issue Report notes (at pp.22-23):

These [potential] issues would be specific topics to be addressed as part of their Charter by the PDP Working Group, in addition to the more general, overarching issues such as:

- **Whether any of the new RPMs (such as the URS) should, like the UDRP, be Consensus Policies applicable to all gTLDs, and the transitional issues that would have to be dealt with as a consequence.**

This passage of the Preliminary Issue Report constitutes further evidence, provided directly by ICANN policy staff, that the question of whether the URS should become a Consensus Policy applicable to all gTLDs is a policy matter, and that it is wholly inappropriate for GDD staff to seek imposition of it on legacy gTLDs as the starting point for renewal agreement

negotiations because doing so creates de facto consensus policy via contract. It also identifies the presence of “transitional issues” that have in no way been considered in pressing for the inclusion of the URS in the three renewal agreements that are the focus of this reconsideration request.

Unless and until the URS is adopted as a Consensus Policy for all gTLDs, ICANN staff should not be initiating the registry agreement renewal process with any legacy gTLD by suggesting that new gTLD RPMs be the starting point for contract negotiation as, given the inequality in bargaining power, this can have the effect of making the URS a de facto Consensus Policy notwithstanding the fact that the regular order PDP outlined in and required by the Bylaws has not been followed.

Global Domain Division (GDD) staff did that in regard to all three of these Renewal Agreements – as we noted in our comment letters:

“The overview for each of these proposed registry renewal agreements contains a “Section I: Description, Explanation, and Purpose” which contains the following statement:

With a view to increase the consistency of registry agreements across all gTLDs, ICANN has proposed that the renewal agreement be based on the approved new gTLD Registry Agreement as updated on 9 January 2014.

We interpret the words “ICANN has proposed” to mean that ICANN staff members within the Global Domains Division (GDD) have proposed this approach.”

In conclusion, as participants in the CSG, GNSO, and the bottom-up multistakeholder process the BC, the NCSG, and the rights of their constituent members are materially and adversely affected whenever ICANN staff seek to impose de facto Consensus Policy in a top-down manner that is inconsistent with the Bylaws, and that fails to take adequate consideration of public comment and relevant facts and considerations in reaching its decisions – especially where the Board subsequently endorses such action by approving the underlying contractual agreement containing the staff-imposed top-down de facto Consensus Policy.

7. Describe how others may be adversely affected by the action or inaction, if you believe that this is a concern.

This consideration was also addressed in our comment letters, as follows:

“Impact on the Community

The staff decision is also contrary to the expectations of many members of the ICANN community. During the lengthy development of the RPMs many

community members of sought assurances that the RPMs would not be imposed on legacy gTLDs until their implementation was fully evaluated and a follow-up PDP was initiated. The GNSO's request for an Issues Report on the RPMs indicates that it has had a similar understanding.

The staff action of taking certain RPMs as a starting point for legacy gTLD renewal RAs is at odds with community expectations that the policy procedures set forth in the Bylaws would be followed. In addition, while registrants at new gTLDs had clear advance notice that they would be subject to the URS, registrants at legacy gTLDs have no such expectation and deserve to have such a decision made through the standard approach of a PDP resulting in the establishment of Consensus Policy.”

The BC and NCSG believe that all members of the ICANN community are materially and adversely affected whenever ICANN staff seeks to impose de facto Consensus Policy in a top-down manner that is inconsistent with the Bylaws, and that fails to take adequate consideration of public comment and relevant facts and considerations in reaching its decisions, and such staff action is subsequently approved by the Board notwithstanding broad public comment urging its reversal.

8. Detail of Board or Staff Action – Required Information

Staff Action: If your request is in regards to a staff action or inaction, please provide a detailed explanation of the facts as you understand they were provided to staff prior to the action/inaction presented to the staff and the reasons why the staff's action or inaction was inconsistent with established ICANN policy(ies). Please identify the policy(yes) with which the action/inaction was inconsistent. The policies that are eligible to serve as the basis for a Request for Reconsideration are those that are approved by the ICANN Board (after input from the community) that impact the community in some way. When reviewing staff action, the outcomes of prior Requests for Reconsideration challenging the same or substantially similar action/inaction as inconsistent with established ICANN policy(ies) shall be of precedential value.

Board action: If your request is in regards to a Board action or inaction, please provide a detailed explanation of the material information not considered by the Board. If that information was not presented to the Board, provide the reasons why you did not submit the material information to the Board before it acted or failed to act. “Material information” means facts that are material to the decision.

If your request is in regards to a Board action or inaction that you believe is based upon inaccurate, false, or misleading materials presented to the Board and those materials formed the basis for the Board action or inaction being challenged, provide a detailed explanation as to whether an opportunity existed

to correct the material considered by the Board. If there was an opportunity to do so, provide the reasons that you did not provide submit corrections to the Board before it acted or failed to act.

Reconsideration requests are not meant for those who believe that the Board made the wrong decision when considering the information available. There has to be identification of material information that was in existence of the time of the decision and that was not considered by the Board in order to state a reconsideration request. Similarly, new information – information that was not yet in existence at the time of the Board decision – is also not a proper ground for reconsideration. Please keep this guidance in mind when submitting requests.

Provide the Required Detailed Explanation here:

(You may attach additional sheets as necessary.)

The BC and NCSG understand that you are requesting “a detailed explanation of the material information not considered by the Board” and that “Reconsideration requests are not meant for those who believe that the Board made the wrong decision when considering the information available.”

The BC and NCSG further note that the Board did consider the specific concerns raised in the public comments on these renewal agreements, including that “Some public comments expressed concern regarding ICANN’s process to use the new gTLD registry agreement as the starting point for renewal RAs for legacy gTLDs. These commenters suggest that taking such a position has the effect of transforming the New gTLD Post-Delegation Dispute Resolution Procedures ... and the Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) into de facto Consensus Policies without following the procedures laid out in ICANN’s Bylaws for their creation.”, as well as that “most of the comments received expressed their objection to the inclusion of the URS to the proposed renewal of .CAT Registry Agreement, claiming that the URS can become a consensus policy only after a full policy development process (PDP) engaged in by the entire ICANN community of stakeholders. These commenters also suggested that imposing URS on a legacy gTLD via the contracting process is an unacceptable staff intervention into the policymaking process.”

We further note and appreciate the Board’s clear statement that “Although the URS was developed and refined through the process described here, including public review and discussion in the GNSO, it has not been adopted as a consensus policy and ICANN has no ability to make it mandatory for any TLDs other than new gTLD applicants who applied during the 2012 New gTLD round.

Accordingly, the Board's approval of the Renewal Registry Agreement is not a move to make the URS mandatory for any legacy TLDs, and it would be inappropriate to do so. In the case of [these registries] inclusion of the URS was developed as part of the proposal in bilateral negotiations between the

Registry Operator and ICANN.” (Emphasis added)

The BC and NCSG particularly appreciate the Board’s clear statement that “ICANN has no ability to make it [URS] mandatory for any TLDs other than new gTLD applicants” and that the Board’s decision “is not a move to make the URS mandatory for any legacy TLDs”.

The material information that we believe the Board has failed to consider is the actual record of exchanges – emails and other correspondence, as well as notes and minutes of meetings and discussions -- between GDD staff and officers and personnel of these three registries that would support the conclusion that “inclusion of the URS was developed as part of the proposal in bilateral negotiations between the Registry Operator and ICANN”. The rationale supporting the Board’s approval of all three of these renewal agreements does not state that it reviewed, or directed non-GDD staff to review, any such documentary evidence in reaching its conclusion that inclusion of the URS was the result of even-handed “bilateral negotiations” rather than staff insistence that the registries accept it to achieve timely registry agreement renewal.

The Board has ready access to such material documentary information given its broad powers to oversee and investigate staff conduct. The BC has no such ability.

While it is true that we could seek disclosure of such material information under the [ICANN Documentary Information Disclosure Policy \(DIDP\)](#) it is unlikely that such disclosure would be timely or complete.

Under the DIDP, “If a member of the public requests information not already publicly available, ICANN will respond, to the extent feasible, to reasonable requests within 30 calendar days of receipt of the request.” The comment period on all three registry agreements was only 40 days. Given that, even if the BC was able to develop and submit a comprehensive DIDP request quickly, there is no assurance that the requested disclosure would be made in a manner timely enough to provide adequate review and analysis of any subsequently disclosed materials for the purpose of guiding the drafting of a BC comment letter. Utilization of the DIDP in such circumstances is not practical within the context of the BC’s lengthy internal drafting and review process for all of its public comments.

Further, even if a DIDP was responded to in a timely manner, there is no assurance that all of the documents requested would be provided, given the multiple Defined Conditions for Nondisclosure that exist in the DIDP. Further, the necessary staff review of documents exchanged and developed in confidential contract negotiations again emphasizes that a DIDP request would not likely have provided the BC with relevant documents in a timely manner given the short public comment window.

In addition, the Board has also failed to consider – because it did not exist at the

time of the Board’s decision – the passage of the just-issued “Preliminary Issue Report on a GNSO Policy Development Process to Review All Rights Protection Mechanisms in All gTLDs” which specifically identifies the question of “[w]hether any of the new RPMs (such as the URS) should, like the UDRP, be Consensus Policies applicable to all gTLDs” as an “overarching” issue in an upcoming PDP, as well as the Report’s citation of “transitional issues that would have to be dealt with as a consequence” of such a policy decision. GDD’s staff actions have had the effect, for the three registries we are now concerned with, of interfering with the standard policy development process as well as ignoring the consideration of important transitional issues, such as the fact that current registrants at these gTLDs have not entered into a registrant agreement that includes their consent to be bound by the URS and other new gTLD RPMs.

In closing, the BC and NCSG wish to express their appreciation for the Board statement that making the URS mandatory for any legacy gTLD would be “inappropriate”, and to support the view that a legacy gTLD can voluntarily adopt RPMs drawn from the new gTLD program at the time of contract renewal.

Our concern is that the Board has not considered material information that is uniquely available to it, as well as key passages of the just-issued Preliminary Issue Report, that would inform it as to whether the inclusion of the URS in these three legacy gTLDs was truly the product of even-handed bilateral negotiations and voluntary registry action, rather than staff imposition of a de facto top-down Consensus Policy that was not the product of a PDP as required by the Bylaws; as well as the full damage to the standard policymaking process when GDD staff make unilateral decisions that are beyond their proper role.

9. What are you asking ICANN to do now?

(Describe the specific steps you are asking ICANN to take. For example, should the action be reversed, cancelled or modified? If modified, how should it be modified?)

In our comment letters on the three renewal registry agreements, the BC’s request was “For all of the reasons cited above, the BC believes it is inappropriate for GDD staff to take the new gTLD RA as the starting point for the renewal of legacy gTLDs. Therefore, section 2 of Specification 7 of the renewal RAs for .Travel and the other gTLDs noted in the introduction to this comment should be deleted.”

The BC and NCSG are now requesting that the Board ask the staff of the GDD to disclose all of the unconsidered material information cited in our answer to question #8, and to review it to determine whether the inclusion

of the URS in these three renewal registry agreements was truly the result of voluntary registry action in the context of even-handed bilateral negotiations. Following such review, the Board should publicly state its conclusions and disclose the material information supporting them.

Further, regardless of the result of the Board’s review of such material information, we believe the Board should instruct GDD staff to refrain from proposing that the approved new gTLD Registry Agreement be used as the basis for legacy gTLD renewal agreements.

Such GDD staff restraint would reinforce the conclusion that a registry’s acquiescence to inclusion of the URS in such an agreement was truly voluntary and the result of even-handed bilateral negotiations. It would also avoid any potential perception that facts are being created by staff to influence the outcome of the PDP(s) that will result from consideration of the just-issued Preliminary Issue Report on a GNSO Policy Development Process to Review All Rights Protection Mechanisms in All gTLDs.

Finally, we are asking the Board to review and consider the above-cited provisions of the October 9th “Preliminary Issue Report on a GNSO Policy Development Process to Review All Rights Protection Mechanisms in All gTLDs” that are relevant to this matter and to recognize the full extent of GDD staff’s intrusion into the policymaking process by effectively seeking to predetermine the outcome of an overarching policy matter prior to the initiation and completion of a relevant PDP.

10. Please state specifically the grounds under which you have the standing and the right to assert this Request for Reconsideration, and the grounds or justifications that support your request.

(Include in this discussion how the action or inaction complained of has resulted in material harm and adverse impact. To demonstrate material harm and adverse impact, the requester must be able to demonstrate well-known requirements: there must be a loss or injury suffered (financial or non-financial) that is a directly and causally connected to the Board or staff action or inaction that is the basis of the Request for Reconsideration. The requestor must be able to set out the loss or injury and the direct nature of that harm in specific and particular details. The relief requested from the BGC must be capable of reversing the harm alleged by the requester. Injury or harm caused by third parties as a result of acting in line with the Board’s decision is not a sufficient ground for reconsideration. Similarly, injury or harm that is only of a sufficient magnitude because it was exacerbated by the actions of a third party is also not a sufficient ground for reconsideration.)

The BC and the NCSG believe it has the standing and right to file this request based upon their long-standing participation in ICANN's activities and policymaking process as a member of the CSG and GNSO.

The material harm and adverse impact suffered by the BC, the NCSG and their members in relation to the integrity and preservation of the Bylaws mandated policy development process is fully described in our answer to question 7.

While a financial value cannot be placed upon this harm, we believe that the multistakeholder policy development policy is priceless and worthy of preservation, and that any harm inflicted upon it is an affront to the global public interest. The relief requested by us in answer to question 9 would reverse or ameliorate the perceived harm and prevent or minimize its future recurrence.

11. Are you bringing this Reconsideration Request on behalf of multiple persons or entities? (Check one)

Yes

No

11a. If yes, Is the causal connection between the circumstances of the Reconsideration Request and the harm the same for all of the complaining parties? Explain.

The BC and the NCSG are both constituent components of the GNSO and participate actively in its policymaking process on behalf of their members; and would suffer comparable harm, as described in our answer to question 10.

Do you have any documents you want to provide to ICANN?

If you do, please attach those documents to the email forwarding this request. Note that all documents provided, including this Request, will be publicly posted at <http://www.icann.org/en/committees/board-governance/requests-for-reconsideration-en.htm>.

Terms and Conditions for Submission of Reconsideration Requests

The Board Governance Committee has the ability to consolidate the consideration of Reconsideration Requests if the issues stated within are sufficiently similar.

The Board Governance Committee may dismiss Reconsideration Requests that are querulous or vexatious.

Hearings are not required in the Reconsideration Process, however Requestors may request a hearing. The BGC retains the absolute discretion to determine whether a hearing is appropriate, and to call people before it for a hearing.

The BGC may take a decision on reconsideration of requests relating to staff action/inaction without reference to the full ICANN Board. Whether recommendations will issue to the ICANN Board is within the discretion of the BGC.

The ICANN Board of Director's decision on the BGC's reconsideration recommendation is final and not subject to a reconsideration request.



13-Oct-2015

Signature

Date

Note: Mr Rafik Dammak was traveling at the time of this submission. His signature can be provided upon request.